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Since 1990, London's SEAQ International attracts considerable trading volume in
Belgian equities. This paper uses transactions, quotation, and limit order book data to
investigate competition between the Brussels CATS market and SEAQ International.
It focuses in more detail on the liquidity (indirect costs) measured by the quoted and
ct1'ectivc bid-ask spread ('ATS outweighs SEAQI tix both measures Thc cffcctivc
sprcad is substantially smaller than the quutcd sprcad "1'he ('A'I'S cllèclivc sprcad
shows a ll-shape form "I'his is in line with the differen[ market micro-structure
models. Total trading costs on CATS are lower (hi~her) tix small (largc) trade sizes.
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In 1985 the London stock exchange started SEAQ International (the Stock Exchan~e
Automated Quotation (SEAQI)), a screen based dealership market devoted to shares
of non-UK companies. London's SEAQI captured considerable trading volume from
the continental exchanges in non-UK equities (see e.g. Worthington (1991)) Since
1990, shares of some major Belgian companies are quoted on SEAQL At the end of
1994, SEAQI denotes about 1204 non-UK companies on its screens of which 14
Belgian ones. Authorities and market participants of the domestic continental
exchanges reacted by modernising and adapting their trading systems as brokers
wanted to regain the market share lost to London. The Brussels stock exchan~e also
experiences this competitive pressure.
In this paper, we investigate competition between the quote driven SEAQ[ and the
order driven Brussels CATS system (Computer Aided Trading System).~ We
obtained a.cimulluireous record of quotes, limit orders, and transactions in bo[h
Brussels and London. This allows us to investigate the cost of trading Belgian shares
on CATS on the one hand, and on SEAQI on the other hand. The cost of a trade has
at least two components. The first is the commission cost. The second is an implicit
cost called the bid-ask spread. The latter arises as it is generally the case that in
selling even a modest amount of shares one gets a lower price than one has to pay to
buy it.
We provide two different estimates of the bid-ask spread. First, we compute the
quoted bid-ask spread. That is the difference, for a particular trade size, between the
lowest ask price and the highest bid price quoted on a market at a point in time The
quoted bid-ask spread is calculated on the basis of the ('A'TS limit order book for
Brussels, and market makcrs' quotes on SEAQI. In contrast with de Jong et. al.
(1995) or Biais et. aL (1995), we observed the riuirr limit order book. More
specifically, the data include not only the five best bid and otlèr pnces and quantities
but also the other limit orders in the book In addition, the data includc Ihc hiddcn
orders. This allows some interesting compansons ot' market liyuidity with and
without such hidden orders. To swn up, the quuted sprcad is directly obsenable in
our datase[ for both markets. Investors are always able to trade a,ainst the quoted
prices: the quoted spread is the price one pays for immediacy. Second, we investigate
the effective bid-ask spread on the basis of transaction prices. 1'heu is the average
~For an carlicr analysis, scc Andcrson and Tychon (1y93a, 199~b).
~ditïèrence between the price at which a dealer sells at one point in time and the price
at which a dealer buys at an earlier poínt in time. The transactions data t2tr L.ondon
imply somc limitationx :tx lhc numhcr of transactions irt our data sct is limilcd In
addition, there may be some misreporting of transaction times- Further, we invextigate
thc rcl:rtion bctwccn sprcad and Iradc sizc un both cxchangcz.
We tind that the quoted spread is substantíally larger than the effective spread. The
hidden orders account for about 16o~a of the entire limit order book. By construction,
the quoted spread increases with trade size This increase is sharper for non-cross
listed shares than for cross-listed ones. The quoted spread on SEAQI is almost tlat in
trade size. We find that the effective bid-ask spread on the CATS market shows a U-
shape form in trade size. This is in line with the market microstructure models but in
contrast with results for the Paris Bourse (De Jong et. al. (1995)). The results ti~r
London show that the etlèctive bid-ask spread and trade size are independent. Total
trading costs on the CATS market are smaller for small trade sizes.
The paper proceeds as follows Section Il provides a description of the markets in
Belgian equities. We discuss the relative importance of both exchanges t2tr trading
Belgian shares Section III analyzes different concepts of liquidity on both exchanges
hy luokin~ at thc quoted and cll"ective sprcad. Section IV studies total trading costs
while section V presents some concluding remarks.
IL DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKETS IN BELGIAN EQUITIES
I I.I. Trading volume
The focus of our analysis is the Belgian shares that are denoted on SEAQI The
Belgian section on SEAQI in lune 1994 includes 14 shares. As we have no data for
the warrant of Petrotina on CATS, we exclude it from our London data set. ln order
to compare cross listed shares with non-cross listed ones, we selected 2S Bclgian
shares with the greatest trading volurne in 1993 (see Table I) The evolution uf
Irading volume during 1990-1994 is given in Table I.'
Trade in foreign shares on the Brussels stock exchange accounts for approximately
2~0'o Note that the 25 Belgian shares account for about 830~0 of total domestic trading
'"I~rading activih in Bclgian shares at othcr cxch:tngcs is ncgligiblc.volume. The cross-listed shares take about 600~0 of total domestic trading volume.
The annual volumes for the Belgian shares on SEAQI are presented in Table Z. We
divide the volumes reported by SEAQI by 2 to render them nwte wmparable to
Brussels volumes.' SEAQI has been successful in attracting trading volume in
Belgian stocks. tt trades around I10 mia BF per year implying 45ojo of tradinf;
volume on spot and forward in the same shares. SEAQI market share declined in
1994 with 5"ro. The yearly behavior of the individual shares seems to vary a lot.
Table I: Annual Volumcs Brusscls (mioBF)
1')JO 1991 1992 1993 1994
"I"otalBn~cvels 7191x5 289999 i1í55l, 49443N i53758
.pot ~ 25.(1n~ 22.2~~ Il,.73~ 13.92~ I1.1C"ió
(orwanl (CATS)Í 75.OOÍ 77.71~ x1.27~ 8l,.OS"Io xR.84~
Poreigns(ocks~ 29.28~ 24.80I 17.Gfi"Io 2L64~ 22.55~
Ikimcstic slockx ~ 70.72I 75.20I x2.34~ 7836I 77.45'Í
Cro.x-listed tírtns
C13R CI3R 59R1 6235 G73i Ifi3írt 19I7n
Iklhaize DG11 12140 2084U 2(BfiG 27722 21535
filectrabel GL13 11794 14809 23495 37575 40291
FortislAG I~OR 4774 3015 41G4 )998 11612
Ckncralc Bnnk GBI: 281G 7lv[5 17n57 2On22 25042
(.BL GDL 4880 3904 1772 8599 11108)
(~R INN() 8M (i113 f,9F8 8324 I1245 1G108 I 143t1
KríYliethaltlc I~I3 2lRn 2(83 1n175 18924 17i77
1'ctrolin;r I'lïr 201H2 2'IT)4 ii167 26J19 27ïi(1
Soc. (icneralc SGR I(171 I 7457 Sxi4 1497G 14529
Solvay 501. I 1 fS46 12158 I I I 13 195vq 27l,33
'f~ractch~l 'IRC 3271 iG7(1 2757 W9Gí IU9ux
IJnion Miniwc I1M 4U53 ill}F1 ixGl 7943 iui1W
(I)'I'olnlcross-lislui 101795 12361f, 161G01 2412111 2G92í2
(llhcractive issues
13e,rco 13AR 1128 1879 I)9( 47J1 4~Oi
13n1. 1381. Ui7 i412 71N7 12x84 7919
HcAacrl Ill~a~ 5(93 i745 54011 IU)41 I51[7
C'ump. Mar. 13c1 CMIi 1337 fd~l4 i954 Sn7x 6264
Cockcrill C(11CI' ï7(1') 19l~ 179G 5197 9i0í
('ulnryt COI. 2241 4401 ixq5 x117x í,4(K,
IflYlr.dinn IiLC' 2527 24T) 27xi 1GIN1 G1162
(nev;rcrt GI?V 2(121 IGS(1 IN42 i424 483i
I'owcrlin PWF IS)J 41117 2x25 G080 iG71
Royalc I1clgc RI3 Ix73 2139 2755 f,9G2 ~423
1'c.,end. Chetnic TLS 23fiG 1774 212i 1x25 a')GII
IICI3 l1Cli 73'NI 7510 N42x IINIG4 or1711
(2) To4d olhcr ac(ivc 16124 41G115 471)4 NIIl2') xi7xd
(I~Jomc~tic 45JI9~~ íG.GxY, 62.19~~ r,2.26i~ t~2.7N"G~
(;)-( I)i-(2) 1181211 IG5221 211x7i6 lili7~1 iíillió
(l~lkimestic Gl.lx'~ 75.7G'~ xn.1i'Í~ x?'Iq"„~ xL7N'7~
Sourcc: Brux.cls slocA cxchangc
' Scvcml othcr studícs apply thc samc proccdurc as thcrc is somc doublc counting of
transactions (Andcrson and Tychon (1993a,b), Hclbling ( 19y3). Pagano and R~cll (199;bp
This doublc counting may occur as both buvcr and scllcr can rcport tr.tdcs to Ih~ London
stock c~changc. Jacquillat and Gressc (1995) show that this could bc an ovcnstimation ofthc
importancc ofSEAQI.
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tiourcc: Bmsscl.e stock exchangc und til?nt,i Intcrnalional
11.2. Tradin~ systents
IL 2J. 7hc Irudirrl;sy.etem nn thc I3nr.~.~eGv ( 'A"l:1' murke(.
The Brussels stock exchange is organized as a continuous market, called the CATS
system.' The CATS computer system continuously provides information on the
market and processes all orders. At 10 00 in the morning, trade starts with a batch
auction followed by continuous trading from 10:00 till 16:30. The CATS system is
an urder clril'crr system as traders submit orders before prices are determined
(Madhavan ( 1992)).
Traders can submit two types of orders, limit orders and market orders. A limit order
specities a quantity of shares to be bought or sold at a prespecitied price. Priority ix
giren according to price and time of submission The exact quantity of shares of~fered
ul asked a1 Ihe limit prices, however, is not necessarily knuwn to traders Extra
liyuidity is wpplied to the market by 'hidden orders' that is portions of limit orders
that are there to be executed against but that are invisible to the users of CATS (Rtlell
( I~)c)2)) Traders like to hide part of their large orders in this way so as not tu alarm
marke[ participants. Marke[ orders` are executed against the best limit orders
outstanding The exchange uses a discriminatory price rule. In other words, market
~ Trading on thc Brusscls stock cxchangc can bc pcrfomicd on a spot b:i.eis (kattanunarkt) or
on a fonvard basis (CATS). Tlic focus of [his study is thc dominating CATS markct.
5 Tradcrs sccking immcdiacy can ahvays submit limitordcrs at a vcry unfavourablc pricc
tiorders are executed at successive prices determined by limit orders on the book
ranked by price priority and time of submission.`' Hence, each inframarginal limit
order is executed at i[s own limit price. A trader submitting a market order runs
execution risk for two reasons (Pa~ano and Rdell (1993a)). First, he does not know
what price he will receive. Second, he is uncertain about the actual execution of hís
order. The latter also holds if one submits a limit order. l'he CATS type of
organisation implies a great transparency (Pagano and Ráell (1996)). It is a real time
system where trades are observed individually. Hence, prices are formed upon
observing the history of order flow in Brussels.
11.2.2. 'I'he Iradu,g.rys-1em al S7zAO Iillernulional (.SL:AOIJ
SEAQI is a quotation system operated by the London Stock Exchange. [t is a
clecrlcr.rhip murke! where market makers are obliged to quote `firm' prices. Quotes
are firm if there are more than two market makers.~ Market makers are obliged to
maintain quotes during the mandatory quote period for at least minimum marketable
quantities. A market maker displaying a price for a larger size must be prepared to
deal at that price and size. Tradinb in shares on SEAQI takes place by telephone.
SEAQI is a ynole drivero market as dealers post prices before order submission
(Madhavan (1992)). Traders know at what price they will trade and therefore face no
execution risk (Pagano and Riiell (1993a)). SEAQI requires no immediate last trade
publication. The latter has two consequences. First, dealers satisfy orders without
knowing about orders received by other dealers. Second, it enables SEAQ[ market
makers to unwind their positions, or take advantage of the obtained information,
either at SEAQI or at the market of `last resort' for Belgian equities in Brussels.
Therefore, it is less transparent than the Brussels CATS market.
Klemperer and Padilla (1993) show that SEAQ[ has an incentive to offer too much
variety from the social point of view. The reason is that if traders have .~hoppinR
cn.~.l.~, they prefer to concentrate their business at a single exchange. Institutional
investors, located in London, have established customer relationships with London
market makers. If the London stock exchange introduces an extra company on its
screens, it captures extra trade in two dimensions. First, it captures business for that
product. Second, it steals business from rival stock exchanges for uther products. This
induces SEAQI to list too many stoeks. At the end of 1994, 120~1 c;ompanies were
`' Brokcrs do not know thc idcntity ofthc countcrparty.
~Thc London stock cxch:uigc can allow 'fimi' quotation cvcn Hhcn thcrc arc onh t~co markct
makcrs. Thc mandatory quotc pcriod for Bclgi.m stocks is ~1 ?fl-IS 311 Londun timc.
6quoted on SEAQI of which 14 Belgian ones. The Brussels stock exchange only
denotes 296 companies Brussels can only attract foreign institutional investors by
ofï~ering sufficiently lower transactions costs or higher liquidity (see also Pagano and
Rucll ( I')91 )1
II1. LIQIIIDITY OF BELGIAN SHARES (INDIRECT COSTS)
fn this sec[ion, we compare the liquidity offered by the two exchanges. Before
imcstigatinp the diffcrent liquiditv measures, we present thc theorics concernin, thc
bid-ask sprexd in subsectiun III I Subsectinn 1112 describes the dala oblained I~rom
the Brussels and London stock exchange, respectively In 111.3., we concentrate on
the measurement of liquidity. We analyze the size of the bid-ask spread, and its
relation with trade size-
11I. I. Theories of the bid-ask spread
In the literature, a number of theories are proposed to explain the existence and size
of the bid-ask spread. Three complementary theories appear, The first relies on nrclrr
pruce.~srn~; cn.~t.~ (Demsetz (1968), Madhavan and Smidt (1991), and Glosten and
Harris (1988)). Processing orders implies a cost as being in the market and handling
transactions is costly. The bid ask spread is a compensation for the service of dealers
This cost should be declining in trade size as these costs are largely lixed per
transaction. A second theory introduces the cu.~7 uj invenlnry munu~emenl. A risk
averse market maker demands a bid-ask spread as he runs an inventory risk. A dealer
with an inappropriate inventory position [ries to accommodate that position hy
reshuffling its bid and ask quotes. Ho and Stoll (1981) show that the inventory
management cost is increasing in trade size and price volatility. A.~ymm~lric
injnrmulia, between a market maker and his traders is a third theory for the existence
of a bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread arises because dealers may trade with
unidentified investors who have superior information. Market makers widen the
spread to recover from the uninformed traders what they lose to the informed traders
This adverse selection risk should increase in trade size as informed traders are more
likely to initiate large trades (Easley and O~Hara (1987)). Figure I shows the relation
between trade size and bid-ask spread for the three different theories. We expect a
U-shape form if the three market microstructure theories are relevant.
7Fi~ure 1: Relation between bid-ask spread and trade size
tradc ,izc
111.2. Data description
We obtained a simultaneous record of quotes, limit orders and transactions in both
Brussels and London.
The Brussels data set consists of two parts, namely data on limit orders and
transactions data. First, we observed the CATS limi! nrJrr book between lune 17 and
June 30, 1994.x More specifically, the limit order book was downloaded six times
per trading day for 25 shares. This implies I500 limit order books. We know the
exact time of downloading. In contrast to previous studies as de Jong et. al. (1995) or
Biais et. al. (1995), we observed the en~irc limit order book (see Table 3). More
specitically, the data include not only the five best bid and offer prices and quantities
broadcasted via the wires, but also the other limit orders in the book. Therefore, we
do not have to impute the fifth best limit order price for all sizes beyond the
corresponding size. In addition, the data include the hidden orders As a result, the
quoted spread is directly observable. We investigate the importance of the hidden
orders ín providing liquidity. Besides this limit order book, there is a ' terms~ market
where brokers can post prices and sizes for at least two million BF. Trades on the
`terms' market have to occur at prices between the best bid and ask prices. The
`terms' market, however, is not used intensively.~' Second, we have transactions
data. During the sample period (lune 17-30, 1994), around 20000 transactions
"The information was downloaded manually from thc CATS screcn starting at 10:30, I 1:30,
12:3Q, 13:30, 14:30 and 15:30. Downloading thc limit ordcr book of Z~ shares took around
30 minutcs.
~' During thc samplc pcriod, only two transac[ions ~~crc ezccutcd on thc 'tcrms~ markct.
xoccurred on CATS. As the CATS market is a real time system, the transactions data
are time stamped. We also know the broker identitication codes allowing us to
identify large transactions executed against a series of small transactions.
'I'able 3 I:rample of a simpliticd limit ordcr bouk (Fortis~AG, 24~061~)4, IOh2') 52)






































The data from the London stock exchange cover the month June 1994. They consist
of two parts. The first is a transcription of' all changes in the trading screen for all 13
Belgian stocks. There are 1700 revisions of quotes during the sample period. We
know the bid and ask quotes, their input times, their sizes, and the identification codes
of the dealers. As market makers are obliged to quote bid and ask prices, we are able
to reconstruct the SEAQI screen at every point durin5 the observation period. The
second part are the transactions data. During June 1994, 1344 transactions occurred
on SEAQI The data denote the buyer and seller code. the transaction time, the trade
price and size, and whether the dealer acts as a principal or an agent. ,As the SEAQI
~)requires no immediate transaction publication, there may be some misreporting of
transaction times. Some deals are reported without transaction time l"
Tables 4 and 5 display the deal size statistics in number of shares and value for CATS
and SEAQI, respectively.ll Deal sizes for the individual shares vary a lot on both
marke[s as shown by the large coefficient of variation. The median transaction size
on SEAQI is about 8 times larger than on CATS. An average order on SEAQI is
around 12 mio BF while in Brussels around 0.9 mio BF. The mean transaction size is
about 13 times larger on SEAQI. Obviously, larger deals are more dominantly
present on SEAQI.
Table 4: Deal size statistics CATS (17-6-94 30-6-1
a .hxre.v valtrc (1 u1NIRl.)
mean ~ meclian mcan "Io mcJiau
cnLtTicicnt ccx-1iicicn(
ofvarixtion ol varixtion
nAR I')7.U) 103.91 100 434.17 1u5.33 22u.7~
nltl, 144.44 247.(,3 In(1 SR7A5 24a.XR 4Ut,.uu
1I1~;1~ 411.27 15821 21) 945,i1 li(,.95 4')i.lu~
('BR 151.3G 232.94 75 IX(d).7R 211.99 o2a.ls
CMI3 217.91 3i9A2 IINI 4')x.(d, 1ií.91 211.iu
COI~P 2757.3X 125.111 I1111(1 SIIILOG IZi17 Ixi,lxl
CUI, 72.G7 IIIG.GU Su S16.7G lul,.xi i,LOu
DI?II SGL93 149.1G 400 75X.71 148A9 5)'1.211
1.1.13 I'xl.ll 212.33 Ilxl IOG1.07 212.51 57?,So
I:LC' 24232 153.7(, I(XI XGi.32 IiS.18 1[,2.lNl
POR 2G4.iy 122.79 2(N) 6T).47 12?.oR SIn.INI
(iliR 119.4X 2119.11(, I(NI )G9.H2 211X.15 XINLINI
(~131. 161.7X 147.G11 I(N) GGG.GS 14X.2G 41i,D0
(~IfV 41.X1 99.(,2 25 37x.R5 v9.57 227St1
G113 44U.32 ISI.R2 t(NI (,30.(W 152.I5 434.4u
IC13 103.20 152.25 Su 670.4G 152.21 125.SU
I'1"I' 7).RG 122.22 60 x17.8R 122.52 Glll.i(1
1'WF 2U7.G5 274.77 Iuu 597.42 273.05 2x3.IN1
RIS 1114.21 117.9t Ilxl 525.}S4 117.74 a'IJ.IX)
tiGlt 24x.7G 2117.14 21N1 542.36 2116.1)2 42X.1111
tiUL 6G.4') 247.115 511 q54.71 2J7.12 7ui,11(1
'ITa xG.94 171.14 25 }549.12 Ix').7J 2ij110
'I~R(' ')7.9a IGS.iI 511 955.n11 Iní.22 dKX.lln
11('H 25.27 IRG.22 211 SYX.12 Ixi.on 4t~').;II
UM 255.25 I55-32 I511 G75,41 I;í-ri7 39í.25
.xchangc
1~~ Thc transactions data include SEAQI as wcll as ofi c~changc tradcs Wc arc not ablc [o
separatc those two types of transactions. However. the numbcr of SEAQI trades ovcrw.helms the offcxchange trades. Thereforc, we believc this is not a scrious problem.
I I Dcal siz(: statistics for an auction market are biascd dowmvards a large order execu[cd against n small ordcrs is rcportcd as n transactions.
10Table 5 Deal size statistics SEAOI (June 19941
M :hures valuc IINI(IBP
mean '~~ mcdiun mum Í mcdian Xub.
cu~~llicicnt cuclliuicnl
u( varialion o( varialion
Clllt 1~7426 177.R9 4nu It~4U9.61 I76.27 5n4').'ri o7
I)Ifll 'ri25.14 2i?.GI ?5(lU 125S9,í4 ~i0.71 4747,77 lOx
IfIJt 2t24.75 '1'1.G6 Ir,12.S linxx.lt, 'Ix.'nl 'lll'i2.77 Ilx
P(llt 'o11Z5í ?17.11 III?S G477.ti i241W 2711.7.1 hll
(ilil~ 1 t~98.7i 1123t, R911 l i766, 15 I i L?4 72R4.12 I iR
(iFil. IXXR.G7 2(IR.?? 5511 R142.IR 21?.NS 22R?.'15 6?
GIR ~~49i.2? 'b7.6? 2115(1 '1866.82 272.U5 ?176.15 40
ICIf 744.?5 127.71 4R0 625?G7 124G5 ?215.97 9?
PICI~ I?2R.93 2R9(1R 4411 WI139.'ll 2R5-'1G 4R2R.R7 157
ti(ill I'7G3S(1 'rG.SR 14110 4412115 '17.1') 71(d13R 711
ti(11. I I11 R.92 ?2 L62 4U0 148115.67 214.OU 615(1.62 I? I
l1tC Iti7.?G 297.12 314.5 li~?L45 2'r4.61 ?I18(LRI 56
UM ?R75.14 IG471 159'l IIIi17.25 IoS.47 4297.St~ li?
tiourcc~ Lundun tilock I~:edmucc
111.3. Measuring liquidity
Liquidity is a concept encountered in the financial marke[ microstructure literature. A
market is liquid if traders can quickly buy or sell lar~e numbers of shares when they
want, and at low transactions costs. Liquidity is measured by the average tradins
cost, i.e. the difference between the market price at which an order is executed and
the 'mid price' (the expected price unconditional on the size and direction of the
order) (op. ci[. Pagano and Rijell (19936)). A measure of liquidity is the bid-ask
spread (gap between the bi(I and ask quotes) liarris (1990) distinguishes frrru"
dimensions of liquidity wiclllr, cleplh, inrmrtliucv uud rra'iliarcy. "1'he bid-ask spread
for a given number of shares determines the widlh. I)eplh refers to the amount oF
shares that can be traded at given bid and ask quotes. ~mmedicrcy refers to the amount
of time it takes to carry uut a transaction. Ilr.~ilirncv is the time it takes bet2ire prices
rt:vcrt lo formcr Icv(:Is alier a lal:;c or(It:r has bccn rcccivcd by thc markct
We turn to two ditierent measures in 111.3 1- and III 3 2. namely the yru~lyd bid-ask
spread, and the rffeclire bid-ask spread In addition, we investigate their relation with
trad( sizc
IIIII. 3. l. Otculed .~nreud rnr lirl~;ian eyuilie.c
The CATS market is organized as a limit order book. The cost of immediacy is
determined by the available orders in the limit order book. The continuous auction is
organized as a discriminatory auction.~Z We observed for 25 shares the limit order
book in Brussels six times a day during ten tradinb days. We measure the average
quoted spread (ATSPR) for an order size ofQ Belgian Francs as follows:
~ ~~ ~~~(!Í,
i.)~- l1(ij, ~,)~~~
A7:SPI2 -; ~; ~ A(rhO~f R(!h 0) ,
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where A(ij,Q) denotes the ask price of a hypothetical transaction at time ij of size Q,
B(ij,Q) the corresponding bid price. A larger trade size results by definition in a
larger average quoted spread as the limit order book widens if Q increa.ees. This
procedure is applied for the limit order book excluding hidden orders (ATSPR) and
including hidden orders (ATSPRH).
The advantage of the Brussels' dataset can be seen from Figure 2. The full short lines
show a1! the available orders in the limit order book, i.e. including the hidden orders.
This leads to the true average spread repre.aented by the ditierence between the two




~2 Thc CATS markct is organiud as a discriminatorv auction- "flicrcfurc. p.Ltisivc liyuidih
supplicrs submit Icss agressivc limit ordcrs to cnsurc that thcv arc appropriatcly compcnsatcd
in thc cvcnt of trading with a largc tradcr (Harris (1990)). As a result, thc quotcd sprcads
should bc largcr than undcr a unifortn auction. This anah sis is comparablc to thc discussion
of sclling trcasury bills via a uniform ordiscriminatory auction (scc c.g. Rcinhart ( IU92)).
12full lines. The dotted short lines reflect the available data in previous studies (e.g.
Biais et. al. ( 1995) or de long et. aL(1995)) In particular, their data only contain the
visible limit orders for at the five best prices In addition, de Jong et. al. ( 1995)
impute the fifth best limit order price for all sizes beyond lhe rangc liir which the bid
and ask price are observed. According to their dataset, the average spread is
measured hy the difference between the dashed lines. "T'herefore, their measure of the
quoted spread uvrrestimates the spread tix smaller trade sizes since they do not
observe the hidden orders. It ~u~clerestimates the quoted spread for larger trade sizes
as the effect of imputing the fifth best price outweighs the hidden order effect.
We apply the same quoted spread measure for the Belgian shares denoted on SEAQI.
As we have overlapping data periods, we applied the procedure in two ways hirst,
we exactly ume matched the data in the Brussels limit order book and SEAQI quotes.
Second, we computed the different measures for SEAQI at 9:45, 10:45, 1 I:45, 12:45,
I3 45, and 14:45 London time. We present the results for the second procedure as the
[wo estimates did not differ substantially. The quoted spread measure assumes that
one executes at the best quote for the amount available and then the residual at the
next best and so on The calculated measure gives a good proxy of immediacy.
Table 6 reports the quoted spread for cross listed shares on both exchanges for various
trade sizes. We first discuss the results for the cross-listed shares on CATS. We
observe the following First, the Brussels market is rather iil;hl for some shares as the
bid-ask spread for the fourchette (lowest ask and highest bid) is low. The quo[ed bid-
ask fourchette varies from (1220'~ for Delhaize till 0 52"'~ fiir GBL The quoted spread
increases immediately with trade size. The latter observation is typical for an auction
market. This is because the minimal order size is fairly low : small investors are ablc
to submit limit orders. Second, the market is not very dcep. This is retlected in a
large bid-ask spread for larger trade sizes, or even that the limit order book runs out
altogether.~ ~ Third, note the variability of the quoted spread shares as measured by
the t-statistic Our analysis shows t-statistics around two. This points to a his~h
variability of the spread These low values, however, are not uncommon. Kleidon
and Werner (1993) as well as Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) report t-statistics of
comparable size. Pagano and Ri)eIl (19936) obtain higher t-statistics for the Paris
Bourse. This can point to a higher execution risk for Belgian shares in Brussels than
~' Wc stop rcporting thc quotcd sprcad whcncvcr at Icast onc limit ordcr book would havc
bcen insufficiently decp for a particular [rade siu. Wc prcfcr not to rcport thc percentagc of
limit ordcr books for which eithcr thc bid or ask would havc run out sincc wc focus on thc
obscrvablc quoted spmad.
13French shares in Paris. Fifth, hidden orders increase the depth of the market. Their
importance can be seen from the difference between both spread measures. Hidden
orders seem to be more important for larger orders. The reasons are the followin~..
Firstly, a fraction of the hidden order is always visible in the book (see also Biais et
al.). Therefore, for small quote sizes, both spread measures are the same. Secondly,
hidden orders can be more avaílable at less favourable prices. In other words, they
can be less aggressive. We computed the importance of the invisible part of the
hidden orders for the 25 Belgian shares. It accounts for about l bo~o of the entire limit
order book. Now we move to the discussion of the SEAQI quoted spreads. We
observe the following. First, SEAQI is a dealership market where market makers
post prices for minimum marketable quantities. This feature can easily be seen from
the table: the quoted spread is independent of size up to a certain amount. Second,
the market touch (difference between smallest ask and highest bid price) varies from
0.83 "~o for Petrofina till 4.09"~o for Soc Generale (SGB). Second, market tightness in
a dealership market is not that big. One reason for this is the size of the mandatory
quote volumes. The latter affect dealers' willingness to quote narrow bid and ask
prices. Third, the quoted spread shows low standard deviation as can be seen from
the rather high t-statistics. This points to low execution risk at SEAQI: investors
know the price concession they have to make at SEAQI. Fourth, the market is rather
deep and the quoted spread does not increase very much with trade size. We have to
keep in mind that dealers are willing to take deals for larger sizes. Finally, we have
no information concerning resiliency.
In this section, we compare the different aspects of the quoted spreads for the cross-
listed shares in the two different trading systems. First, the market `fourchette' in
Brussels is much smaller than the market `touch' in London. The quoted spread
increases sharply in trade size in Brussels vis-à-vis London. The SEAQI spread
remains constant up to the minimum marketable quantities. Second, the results for
market depth depend on the individual shares. Some shares show a deeper market in
Brussels than in London and vice versa. Third, an investor trading in London faces
less execution risk than in Brussels: there is less variation of the hid-ask spread in a
dealership market than in an auction market. This confirms the theoretical results of
Biais (1993). Fourth, a dealership market seems more robust to large orders Dealers
always quote prices even when large orders enter the markeL If a large order hits the
limit order book of an auction market, it can take some time before market depth and
tightness reach their former level.
14Table 6 Avera(~e quoted soreads for cross listed shares on CATS and SEAOI
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~bTable 7 Avera[:e guoted spreads for non-cross listed shares on CATS
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~ÍTablc 7 reports the results for the non-cross listed shares. These shares are less
frequently traded than the cross-listed ones. This is reflected in the liquidity of their
markets. First, the market is not that tight as can be seen from the higher quoted
spreads at the fourchette. Second, the limit order book runs out very fast. In
addition, the quoted spread increases quickly with trade size. In other words, the
limit order book for the non-cross listed shares is not deep. Third, traders willing to
trade larger sizes against the limit order book have to sptit up their orders ínto smaller
ones. This splitting up device is less present for the cross-listed shares.
Ill.3.?. Lfjective spread and rrade .rize
The quoted spread is the cost one incurs for immediate execution. Other trading
strategies can offer lower trading costs. For instance, in a denlership market, market
makers often grant discounts to medium and large retail orders. Therefore, transaction
prices differ from dealers' posted quotes. [n an aacliun market, timing of the order
submission can substantially decrease the indirect trading costs. This is the focus of
this subsection. The proposed proxy of the bid-ask spread is the effective bid-ask
spread. This measure is based on transactions prices. More specifically, we propose
the absolute difference between the, at the same time, quoted mid-price
(A(i,0)tB(i,0))l2 and transaction price T(i,Q). The spread is twice this difference as
it is the price difference between a buy and sell order. Formally,
N
.Sc(~))- z~ 2'I'(i.i~) - I
A(i,0) t I3(i,0)
IN
This measure requires for the same time stamps knowledge of transaction price and
the limit order book (CATS), or ihe quote data (SEAQI).
a SEA 1
We start with analyzing SEAQI as that data set contains transactie~n priccs as well as
quote data. As in De Jong, Nijman and Riiell (1995), we exclude all transactions
outside the mandatory quote period. The mid-quote outside those hours is not a
reliable proxy for the market valuation of a stock. Before discussing the results, three
remarks are at order. First, the number of transactions in our data set (June 1994) is
limited. Second, some trades did not include dealing times. Therefore, we dropped
these observations. Third, there may be some misreporting of trading times. Given
these caveats, we discuss the results of Table S.
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The effective spread is lowest for the Generale Bank (0.640~0) and highest for the
Societe Generale ( I.830~0). There is a lot of variation in the effective spread as can be
seen from the standard deviation The effective spread is substantially smaller than
the quoted spread. This implies that a lot of trades are executed within the market
touch.
Tablu')~ Modcl hsLtied estimates ofeffective sprcad (SEAQI)
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19Table 8 also reports the effective spread for several size classes. We computed the
effective spread for three groups of trade size smaller than 3 million BF, between 3
and 9 million BF, and the rest. The effective spread is in general not higher for a
higher trade size. [n order to estimate the relation between effective spread and trade
size, we regress the following equation:
Se~(Q)l2 - S t aQ~ f oczi t Y~z,
with S~,-,i(Q) - effective spread for transaction at time t(not in absolute values)
Qi1(-1) iftransaction price at time t~(~) mid-quote for transaction at time t
z, - size of transaction in mio BF at time t(t for buy order, - for sell order).
This equation is a flexible functional Form allowing for different shapes. We
censored the large trade sizes to reduce the impact of very large transactions. As de
Jong et. al., we took the 95"~a quantile. The results are shawn in Table 9, panel A.
The parameter estimates can be interpreted as percentage price etiects. Twice the
coefficient a is the estimated effective spread for trade size zero. The effects of trade
size vary across shares. Their is little evidence that there ís a trade size effect. The
Wald test for trade size is significant at 5"~o in 5 cases out of 13. The results,
however, suggest different shapes. This can be seen in Panel B of Table 9 where we
present the implied estimates. These results are comparable to those of De Jong,
Nijman and Róell (1995) who do not find a significant trade size effect for French
equities denoted on SEAQI.
b CATS
We can not apply the same procedure for estimating the effective spread on CATS as
we have no conlinuous record of the limit order book. Therefore, we have to infer the
spread by other means. A first proxy is Roll's measure. Even if the market is
informational efficient, and no news arrives, observed market price changes are not
índependent because recorded transactions occur either at the bid or at the ask, not at
the average (Roll (1984)). Roll's measure assumes [hat the next order arriving in the
market is with equal probability a sell or buy order. A buy order will be executed at
the ask price while a sell order at the bid price. The spread estímators based on
transaction prices use the first order autocovariance of the returns. The measure of the
implicit bid-ask spread proposed by Roll (1984) is :
20S.,,u -2 -cov~rr,rr i~
where r, is the percentage return on the stock between time t-I and time t.
We applied Roll's estimator to transactions data for 2S Belgian shares over the period
June, 17 1994 [o June, 30 1994.14 There is no problem of timing the transaction as
the orders are transmitted through the computerised CATS system. As the auction
market uses a discriminatory price rule, big orders are executed against more than one
limit order at different prices. These orders are easily identified as they show the same
time stamp and buyer or seller code. As in De Jong, Nijman and Roell (1995) we takc
these cases as nne transaction with the quantity weighted average as price. The
results are shown in column 2 of Panel A of Tables 10 and I I. The estimates of Sri11
differ a lot across companies. I[ is smallest for Delhaize and highest for Powerfin.
The Roll model has been extended to incorporate other aspects of the bid-ask spread.
Table 10 Model based estimates ofeffective spread (CATS)
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21Table I I: Model based estimatcs ofthe effective snrt:ad for non-cross listcd shares ICATS'
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A second indirect measure of the effective spread is based on a structural model of
transaction prices. These estimators do not need the limit order book to obtain a
proxy for the effective spread. However, they require information whether the
transaction was buyer or seller initiated. That information, however, is partly missing
in our dataset. We can classify the market and limit orders that are executed against
more than one limit order. These account for about 170~0 of all orders. For the
remaining orders, we apply the zero-upticklzero-downtick method to classify if a
transaction was buyer or seller initiated. More specifically, if the price increases
(decreases), we assume the trade was buyer (seller) initiated. If the price remains
constant, we assume the same initiation as the previous trade.ls This allows us to
estimate the following relationship (for derivation and econometric issues: see the
appendix )
4i, - h" t~~), t otz, ty ~z, t lagged lerm.c t e, t ~u,
1` Biais. Hillion, and Spatt ( 1993) applied this rule to transactions data from the Paris Bourse.
Thcir results show that thc rule classifies 93 "~o of thc ordcrs corrcctl~ Our results for thc
I7"~o of thc ordcrs we could classify an. similar. In addition, lhcrc is a sclf con-ccting
mcchanism as the orders we could classify are sprcad all over the data. "fiicrefore- we beaicve
[hat morc [han 95"~ of thc orders is classificd colnctly.
22The price change is a function of whether the trade was buyer or seller initiated (Q,- I
(-I ) if the transaction was buyer (seller) initiated), and of the size of the trade (z,).
We censored the large trade sizes to reduce the impact of very large transactions. We
took the 99.5"~o quantile.~`' The estimation results for the cross-listed shares are
shuwn in Panel A of Tables 10. We focus on the trade size effect. The coefficients
of size and inverted size are small. However, according to the Wald test, 12 out of 13
are jointly significant at the 10"~0 level. In addition, they all show a U-shaped form.
This can be seen from the implied estimates in Panel B of Table 10. This is in line
with the different market microstructure theories but in contrast to the findings of De
Jong et. aL (1995) for the Paris Bourse. Table I I shows the results for the non-cross
listed shares Trade size seems to be less important as shown by the results of the
Wald test. Most shares, however, show also a U-shaped form. The implied
estimated effective spreads are higher for non-cross listed shares than for cross-listed
ones.
c) Comparinr; CATS and SEAOI
Comparing indirect trading costs by means of the effective spread shows that Brussels
dominates l.ondon This result is comparable to Ihe one obtnined in comparing
Lundun and Paris (Ue .long, Nijman and Ríiell ( 1995)) hirst, Ihc diftèrcnce bctwecn
Brussels and London decreases as trade size increases. The difference remains at
least 0.20~0 (KB trade size IOmio). Second, there is cunsiderable variation across
shares. Therefore, we cannot uniformly conclude for which trade size London
dominates Brussels in terms of indirect tradin~ costs. Third, London and Brussels
show a smaller difference in effective spread than in yuuted spread.
IV. TOTAL TRADING COSTS
Traders submitting orders incur at least two costs namely a direct and indirect trading
cost. The former is mearured by the commission rate. The latter is [he impact on the
price of submitting an order and was the focus of section II1.3. In this section, we
add both cost components to obtain a picture of the competitiveness of the Brussels
CATS and the London SEAQI market. Until October 21, 1994, commission rates un
~`' Hausman ct.al and dc Jong ct. al also ccnsor at thc 99.i";~ quantilc.
23the Brussels stock exchange were fixed according to a decreasing schedule (see Table
12). The London Stock exchange publishes yearly an overview of commission rates
charged on SEAQI (see Table I2). Comparison of both schedules shows that
commission rates on CATS are substantially higher than on SEAQI.
Table 12: Commission rates.
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Adding both cost components yields total trading costs for our sample period (June
1994). We apply the yiioted .~~reacl as a measure for indirect trading costs.
Applying the same exercise with the effective spread would not yield additional
insights. We take as indirect trading costs the unweighted average for all shares. We
offer total trading cost measures for CATS up to 6 mio BF and SEAQI up to 7 mio
BF as this is the deepest size available for all shares. CATS outweighs SEAQI for
deal sizes up to about I.5 mio BF. SEAQI provides lower trading costs for larger
trades. The CATS percentage trading costs increase with deal size as the quoted
spread increases more than the commission schedule decreases For Brussels,
commissions dominate total transactions wsts. The reverse holds for SEAQI.
Since October 21, 1994, commission rates on the Brussels stock exchange have been
liberalized. Until now, the liberalisation of wmmission rates did not induce a price
war between brokers. However, some brokers and banks decreased their commission
24rates for large orders.~~ In order to gain insights in the effects of the liberalisation of
commission rates, we present the followint; exercise. The hypothesis otten advanced
is that high commission costs lead to low execution costs and vice versa. Berkowitz
et al (198A) estimated the trade off between direct and indirect transactions costs at
the NYSE hetween different types of brokers Their results indicate that there is not a
one to one trade otl~ between both types ofcosts. More specitically, their results show
that a decrease of 10 basis points in commission rates implies an increase of indirect
trading costs of about 2 basis points. In addition, lowering commission rates in
Brussels has effects on the strategies of SEAQI dealers The latter can improve their
quotes. In other words, the indirect trading costs on SEAQI may decrease. In figure
3, we also applied the commission schedule of a large representative bank after the
liberalisation of commission rates. Figure 3 shows the results incorporating the
results of Berkowitz et. al. on the impact on indirect trading costs (CATS(aft)).
Fieure 3 Trldin~ cost on the basis of the quoted spreads.
cross-listed shares
p 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
mio BF
0.8 I
0.6 ~ - ---- --- -
~~:::t3~~
~ CATS -~- SEAQI ~ CATSlaft)
Given the caveats mentioned earlier, trading costs seem fairly comparable between
SEAQI and CATS after the liberalisation of the commission rates in Brussels.
Therefore, we can conclude that this liberalisation enables brokers to compete with
SEAQI dealers for lar~er deals,
~~Thc 'Financicel Ekonomischc Tijd' of 10~12194 providcs a short survcy of commission
schcdulcs Thcir conclusion is tha[ thc pn.viously fixcd commission ratcs rcmain for smallcr
[r.uisactions. Commission ratcs for largcr Inuisactions, howcvcr, dccrcascd
~5V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since 1985, London's SEAQ International has been successful in capturing trading
volume in non-UK equities from the continental exchanges. This paper investigates
competition for trading Belgian shares between SEAQ International and the Brussels
CATS market. More specifically, we compared direct and índirect trading costs for
Belgian shares on both exchanges. We used a simultaneous record of quotes, limit
orders, and transactions in both Brussels and London. Our dataset of Bnissels
encompasses all limit orders. More precisely, it incorporates not only the five best
bid and ask prices and quantities but also the other limit orders in the book. In
addition, the data include the hidden orders. As a result, our dataset allows to obtain
unbiased estimates of the quoted bid-ask spread reflecting the cost of immediacy.
The results indicated that the Brussels CATS market is considerably tighter than
SEAQ International. The latter, however, is deeper. The results about the size of the
effective spread go in the same direction. The advantage of Brussels, however, is
smaller.
We investigated the relation between bid-ask spread and trade size. The quoted
spread is, by construction, increasing in trade size. This feature is more important for
non-cross listed shares. The results for the relation between effective spread and trade
size depend on the exchange. Trade size seems to be important on the CATS market.
The results indicate a U-shape form implying a larger market impact for small and
large trade sizes whereas a smaller one for intermediate trade sizes. This is in line
with the different market microstructure theories. Their is little evidence that there is
a trade size effect on SEAQ International for Belgian equities.
Total trading costs indicate that Brussels is cheaper for small transactions while
SEAQ Intemational dominates for larger ones. This explains to some extent the
location of financial activity. More precisely, larger transactions typically occur on
SEAQ International whereas smaller ones on the Brussels CATS market.
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29APPENDIX
Model based estimates of the effective bid-ask spread.
We make some assumptions concerning the price generating process
The price p, is equal to the unobserved mid-price y,, plus or minus one half times the
spread for the fourchette, the effect of trade size and inverse trade size (z, ), plus an
error term u,. Formally,
p~ - Y~ t(Sl2)Q~ f a.z, tY~T~ t u, (A I)
with Q, - 1(-I) if transaction was buyer (seller) initiated.
z, - size of trade (buy - positive sign, sell - negative sign)
y, - unobserved mid-price.
In order to have observables only, we have to make assumptions concerning the mid-
price y,.
If there is asymmetric information and inventory control by market makers, they will
revise the mid-price and quotes after a trade occurs. Suppose (1-n) is the fraction of
the spread corresponding with asymmetric information and inventory control, and n
the fraction corresponding with processing cost. The mid price after a transaction
then looks like follows:
m~ - Y~ } (1-n)((S~2)Q~) (A2)
The public information arriving between two trades influences the new mid price
Y~ - Rn t rn,., } G (A3)
with j3„ the average and e, the unexpected public information.
30Afier taking first differences of(AI), and substituting A2 and A3 into AI, we obtain
the following equa[ion:
,1' ~ ~1~ f cc-, f Icrl;.~eJ ~cv~m.~ t c~, t Au,
"I'his equation can be estimated by OLS if p, and Q, are observable, and Q, and z, are
uncorrelated with the error terms. The trade sign Q, and the error term might be
correlated implying that an instrumental variable technique should be used. The error
terms follow a first order moving average structure and probably are heteroskedastic,
AII this implies that the standard errors have to be corrected. We apply the method of
Newey and West (1987) to compute heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors.
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